Inner
Speech of a Lion
Wit
has to ask what relation of sea and land exists in a proposition where a lion
would speak or a dog feel and whether a rose has teeth (or teech, and if you
change beach to teach, why not change two more letters and have teeth teach
too?) Where would they be, in the heart
of the petals? The sea and land without record, without writing, without
teeth ephemerate into nothing, for that
rose has thorns (and they are its teech, its teeth its speech) like a tree has
bark in that world where leaves cover its trunk. We can reverse these
teech-teeth nicely into mouse singers singing operas and dogs undertaking
investigations of being. To pretend a dog or a mouse is like a man whose
[thinking goes on within his consciousness in seclusion] when there is no one
to [read the silent internal discourse of others], <222> how could they
if they cannot read themselves. A man is a book or a land without reference to
[a game of guessing thoughts] but if I say that [what is internal is hidden
from us] like [the future is hidden from us] it is no wonder we have not
discovered our land from which we observe the sea, for Miss Bentley still does
not know what she wants to be and thinks it OK. But the future is not hidden from
us, it is the past and in the same way that if [a lion could talk we could not
understand him] it is not the talk
of the lion past we seek but its thought,
for even if it doesn’t talk it thinks, and that inner speech of the lion is our
concern. We cannot guess from its face or its eyes of brightness and intelligence, just as a man
enslaved whose eyes show such servility, while he waits his change, his chance
to freedom, his inner speech, inner intent is freedom, but we don’t have to
read either the lion or the man to know his nature is to eat and be free.
In
all this back and forth Wit continues to ask what it’s like to feel another’s
pain and how it is certain to know [that this man is in pain] which is not ask
our reading of thoughts, which have many shades and color and are never just
one thing but one thing doubted, then inverted, then smelled and weighted so
that the thought, [the height of Mount Blanc depends on how one climbs it] is a
belief tone, a color of thought, inner speech calculation, for the language no one speaks is a math of
the mind that examines whether [a dog
can be a hypocrite] transferring to the dog the inner speech of the man who is
a hypocrite for his thousand thoughts unspoken, and how and whether any one of
those thoughts emerges in action is
remote to his knowing, for his impulse is his action and that is no inner
speech at all. So if he has a dog [a dog
cannot either be a hypocrite or sincere] it is only by his transference that he
says this, for the dog is never anything but sincere and cannot hide his inner
speech when it comes to the man. The dog will always show his affection, or not,
to the man, but a dog is a hypocrite to his food. We know that from the sneaking crusts of bread out of the trash
or the holes in bags of feed on the porch gnawed a little at the margin like
there were root rats but we know the cause, and we say all this to say at the
end that the concept of learning the
past is revealed in the remembering of it and what it feels like to
remember is a first awareness of the land you stand on before the sea of thought
where the past is all the land there is to stand on. That ending/beginning in
the past and in memory enables the man to stand and see and think. Like any
sentient being, the dog, the lion awaits in anticipation of every moment that
he hopes and waits in faith to come, so the past is hope too and memory. And
that is Part Two.
A
Stone
We
go backwards to know ourselves, for we wake and find we have been standing
there a long time and the waves have made no impression washing up on us and
going out and conducting their own lives with turtles and urchin and seaweed
and driftwood that comes and goes in the tide. The question is not how do I
know my image, but how do I remember
it. This is not about the image of the imagination, the colors of red as a
picture, conflating the image in my head with the land and its memory, that
with the past enables us to ask [Could one imagine a stone’s having
consciousness?]. Is a stone conscious like a lion or a man, or anyone who has
thought about the stone as a lima bean of consciousness, but has no way to
express it, no voice, no arms, no legs, no eyes, no ear, no skin, no teeth, but
a mind thinking in the bean just the same as in the stone? Ipso facto, said
this way, if I imagine [that each of the people whom I see in the street are in
frightful pain but concealing it] and the waves and the sand and the sea and
the mind of the land conceal inner speech that [the soul is in pain but what
has that to do with the body?], feeling
pain is like feeling memory the first time, waking on the shore to the wind
and salt concealed all this time, now shorn, the same way the man is shorn who
is in pain, for imagine that I see they are in pain or rather I feel it before
the words of inner speech become conscious. After the words I think that the
man is in pain but concealing it. Shades and shadows of the dog-hypocrite for food,
the man is an actor imagining himself whatever it be, hypocritely for saying, I
saw an image but not in my eyes.
Where
then the image of the pain, and where is the image of the world, of the sea, of
the waves or the land if not in the eyes inverted into the mind? The image is in the feeling evoked by the
image, the field of flowers in a field under a cliff in Blanco, a plight of
immortal amarant calling. Do not ask if flowers are sincere, but do ask about
the feeling the image gives, the flower hanging down, for the thought is the
image, the imagination is the image whereby I do know whether I or anyone else
is in pain. [Imagine people standing in a circle and among them one connected
to an electric, and try to see which one has been shocked, for one has, except
now I know it is myself [123,] If I
suppose [I can feel the shock even when someone else is electrified] I am
connected with them and feel them, unless I am anaesthetized or paralysed the
way the angels are who cease to remember themselves. If paralyzed what is the
difference from that prior state where we stood on the shore but did not know
it or the waves breaking, because knowing is every case for us, that is real knowing, which is feeling and feeling
is remembering. The first time we feel a thing we do not know what it is
but building up a pattern of memory we know and can say in our inner speech
those very words, he is in pain, I am in pain, we are in pain. All because we
feel.
An
Ape
Nor
can we account for all those not in pain or who say they are anyway, but ape
their pain, or those who act as if there is an [unbridgeable gulf between
consciousness and brain], for them consciousness is feeling, not thinking,
which only comes after feeling and is abstracted to memory from which the ape
asks whether it is conscious and feels pain, which is as if to ask if there are
[witnesses that they have consciousness], how can there be witnesses to inner speech? These charades are species of automata
[can I imagine that the people around me are automata, and lack
consciousness……with fixed looks (as in a trance?)] <126> When I admit that [while he was speaking I
did not know what was going on in his head]
should I like to see into his head it is the same as with the pain of
shocks in a circle. I cannot know his
pain or his thought without connecting it to my own and my own thought and pain are memory of
feelings cataloged in the past. Retrospectively without his pain and memory
and my pain and memory I am a Robinson Crusoe of the mind and [it is as if I
have imagined that the essential thing about a living man was the outward form]
<128>. Outer form, inner speech, shared feeling, mutual pain, mutual
thought, I knew what he was thinking and I said it, my stone, my block of wood.
A
Mind-Ear
The
possibility that there could be human beings unattached to their words, to whom
speech is an alien is the case. And everything is the case. What would it be
like for a human being to never find a word on the tip of their tongue however is
not the case, for they always do find the word that they then speak. This is a
measure of what they hear. The tip of
the tongue is thus the ear and the ear is thus the mind, for they hear the
word in their mind as something inchoate, vague, a glimmer now in the eye, the
mind’s eye. So in mind-ear or eye they say it’s on the tip of the tongue. I
just can’t think of the word but it will come.
But
what is hearing, seeing, thinking, speaking, imagining? What is the silent internal speech that
saying inwardly or singing inwardly but read silently is to be learned? The
learning is in the listening to that hearing that is no voice. Voice had to be
invented for thought, prethought and afterthought to emerge. All you have to do
is speak, but speaking evaporates in air, but to write, the writing is engraved.
Thus transcribed thought can be heard and
seen as many times removed from the tip of the tongue, for what anyone says to himself within himself is hidden from me. This
not knowing is not as strange as the desire to know what another is thinking to
himself on the tip of the tongue when we do even not know ourself what we are
thinking to ourself.
Our
thoughts come in waves of particulars and themes over and over like the sea
rolling up and falling back. They always have and always will but it is as
though we never knew we stood on the beach (the teach, just change the initial
letter) and hear them, smell them, feel them. What even if the beach is our
thought within ourself as waves, who am I otherwise as land and if my soul
anyway is not of the land but of the sea?
Hold on to that land, it is the point of departure that grew slowly in
mind and took permanence as the ID as much permance as it has to, and the longer the life land exists the
more wonder it holds in its memory of itself. There on the shore is its
history, for the place is its face, the place is its land on which its feet
stand and watch the waves roll in. And that is how I know I am alive.